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Formally Modeling the Terrapin Attack on SSH — arXiv:2609.26358

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26358
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T14:42:13.441Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
2b5f68de61986194b9f263a3596d443787518b1f082dc6198137e10eee7e32fc
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_925d7733fd92

How to cite

Formally Modeling the Terrapin Attack on SSH — arXiv:2609.26358 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26358 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_925d7733fd92 (Metraipolis archive dc_925d7733fd92, sha256 2b5f68de61986194b9f263a3596d443787518b1f082dc6198137e10eee7e32fc)
BibTeX
@misc{dc925d7733fd92,
  title = {Formally Modeling the Terrapin Attack on SSH — arXiv:2609.26358},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26358},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_925d7733fd92; sha256 2b5f68de61986194b9f263a3596d443787518b1f082dc6198137e10eee7e32fc},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26358. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The Terrapin attack against SSH channel integrity (USENIX Security 2024) used a novel attack vector: attacks on the channel state. Surprisingly, not all AEAD modes of SSH were equally affected by this attack, and it remained an open question if "unaffected" meant "secure". Existing formal models for secure channels are based on stateful encryption. However, these models do not define what the channel state is and how it is used as input to the different AEAD modes. In this paper, we propose a formal model for channel integrity under partially chosen state. Applied to the Terrapin attack, the chosen state is the SSH sequence number. It uses an abstract stateful encryption interface, for which we provide pseudocode descriptions for the eight most prominent AEAD modes used in SSH. By varying the SND oracle, we can model ciphertext-only (CO; the Terrapin attack), known-plaintext (KPA), and chosen-plaintext (CPA) attacks. This allows us to establish concrete bounds on the security of the AEAD modes. We find that all three Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) modes and ChaCha20-Poly1305 in SSH are insecure in the CO model. AES-GCM is the only cipher secure in all three model variants. Going beyond Terrapin, we show that Encrypt-and-MAC (EaM) with a CBC cipher is secure, even in the KPA model. In particular, we describe a novel BEAST-like chosen-plaintext attack on the channel integrity of EaM-CBC, which separates the KPA and CPA models for this scheme.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-23 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26358 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T13:55:11.759Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-23?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).