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Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion — arXiv:2611.06644

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06644
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-05T18:39:33.984Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
4b0f8569898cecbccde88ab9e78f13ce716ba2454e57ef432929bf2dd20602c2
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How to cite

Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion — arXiv:2611.06644 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06644 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9207c27069ba (Metraipolis archive dc_9207c27069ba, sha256 4b0f8569898cecbccde88ab9e78f13ce716ba2454e57ef432929bf2dd20602c2)
BibTeX
@misc{dc9207c27069ba,
  title = {Universal Nonexistence of Monotone Equilibrium in Multiunit Auctions with Risk Aversion — arXiv:2611.06644},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06644},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9207c27069ba; sha256 4b0f8569898cecbccde88ab9e78f13ce716ba2454e57ef432929bf2dd20602c2},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06644. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We establish universal nonexistence results for monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in multiunit auctions with risk-averse bidders. Fix any number of bidders greater than one and any profile of strictly increasing concave utilities, with at least one strictly risk-averse bidder. Under uniform pricing, for every supply of at least three units, we construct independent, full-support type distributions under which neither lowest-winning-bid nor highest-losing-bid pricing admits an admissible monotone equilibrium. Under discriminatory pricing, we construct a finite supply and independent, full-support type distributions that preclude monotone pure-strategy equilibrium. We extend these results to all-pay auctions and finite bid grids.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06644 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-05T18:31:31.580Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).