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From Silicon to Boot Code: Extending Automated Program Repair to Firmware-Layer Security Workarounds — arXiv:2609.01769
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01769
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-17T05:14:01.628Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
e54d288157097259fd37e35bf8195f4e0cb9b4afb9d5aaf41a4aacec4dffbc26- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_91fe751b09a9
How to cite
From Silicon to Boot Code: Extending Automated Program Repair to Firmware-Layer Security Workarounds — arXiv:2609.01769 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01769 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_91fe751b09a9 (Metraipolis archive dc_91fe751b09a9, sha256 e54d288157097259fd37e35bf8195f4e0cb9b4afb9d5aaf41a4aacec4dffbc26)
BibTeX
@misc{dc91fe751b09a9,
title = {From Silicon to Boot Code: Extending Automated Program Repair to Firmware-Layer Security Workarounds — arXiv:2609.01769},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01769},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_91fe751b09a9; sha256 e54d288157097259fd37e35bf8195f4e0cb9b4afb9d5aaf41a4aacec4dffbc26},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01769. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Automated program repair (APR) research has been constrained to design time. Current techniques localize and fix bugs in RTL or HLS designs before a chip reaches production. Once a hardware vulnerability surfaces post-silicon, the patch must be manually generated: existing automation addresses patch deployment but not patch synthesis. We study the feasibility of extending a dictionary-guided, localize-synthesize-validate APR methodology originally developed for RTL repair to this firmware layer. An automated commit-clustering miner surfaces recurring fix templates across the EDK II (UEFI) firmware repository's full commit history without depending on known CVE identifiers, recovering all three known CVE-fix campaigns and surfacing two additional candidate bug families. Grounded in real fix evidence, we build four independent localizers: missing speculation barriers in C (CVE-2017-5753, Spectre v1), missing bounds checks before array writes in C (a decompression library CVE), missing Return Stack Buffer stuffing in x86 assembly (CVE-2017-5715), and missing integer-overflow guards in Hand-Off Block creation code (surfaced by the miner itself). All four achieve 100% recall; precision ranges from 2.1-15.5% on the C families to 100% on the assembly and HOB families. Root-cause analysis of the C-family false positives attributes 77-90% to two intra-procedural causes, isolating the inter-procedural alias-analysis gap as a measured 15-20% rather than an estimate. A held-out test confirms Spectre v1 localization holds at 100% recall on unseen files; a fifth, independently built dictionary entry (CVE-2018-3630) shows the methodology extends to a new bug signature at low cost; and a naive syntactic baseline recalls at most 14% where our detector recalls 100%. We frame these results within a broader research agenda for a unified hardware-to-firmware correctness lifecycle. Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-03 in cs.SE). Categorie arXiv: Software Engineering (cs.SE). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01769 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-17T04:25:46.771Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.SE/2026-09-03?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).