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Nought Venture, Nought Have: Risk Taking and Efficient Investment in Matching Markets — arXiv:2611.02504
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02504
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T19:07:15.450Z
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How to cite
Nought Venture, Nought Have: Risk Taking and Efficient Investment in Matching Markets — arXiv:2611.02504 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02504 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8fb9d72bf841 (Metraipolis archive dc_8fb9d72bf841, sha256 10077f21a5f2d7911a83bd6f30957147fa9e6eaf20e8615401fe533486a17f35)
BibTeX
@misc{dc8fb9d72bf841,
title = {Nought Venture, Nought Have: Risk Taking and Efficient Investment in Matching Markets — arXiv:2611.02504},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02504},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8fb9d72bf841; sha256 10077f21a5f2d7911a83bd6f30957147fa9e6eaf20e8615401fe533486a17f35},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02504. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study a two-sided assortative matching market in which agents attract partners through costly investment and strategic risk taking. Each agent chooses an investment level and an arbitrary distribution of nonnegative quality that is a mean-preserving spread of investment. We allow for unequal populations and different investment costs across populations. Finite markets have a unique nontrivial semi-symmetric equilibrium, with investment below the Pareto frontier. We show that this inefficiency disappears as the economy grows with the population ratio held fixed and characterise its rate of convergence. The limit provides a foundation for the analysis of large matching markets, by selecting a unique efficient equilibrium from the continuum economy's infinitely many equilibria, which feature efficient investments but different risk-taking profiles. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02504 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T18:25:22.741Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).