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Reaching Fairness by Reallocating Goods — arXiv:2608.30669
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30669
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-17T08:19:28.156Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
Reaching Fairness by Reallocating Goods — arXiv:2608.30669 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30669 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8ddde2180469 (Metraipolis archive dc_8ddde2180469, sha256 686e5b6a71818b9d2a8f52a6787a1e10e5af2c3ab5597902c61a1c6ca7bf57a7)
BibTeX
@misc{dc8ddde2180469,
title = {Reaching Fairness by Reallocating Goods — arXiv:2608.30669},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30669},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8ddde2180469; sha256 686e5b6a71818b9d2a8f52a6787a1e10e5af2c3ab5597902c61a1c6ca7bf57a7},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30669. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Fair allocation of indivisible goods has largely been studied under the assumption that no prior allocation exists. Motivated by practical settings with pre-existing (and possibly unfair) allocations, we study how to achieve fairness through limited reallocations. Building on recent work on reformability/reallocations, we consider three fairness notions---envy-freeness (EF), envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)---and optimize the number of goods reallocated. We analyze both the classical and parameterized complexity of these problems, providing a comprehensive analysis across multiple fairness notions. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-01 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30669 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-17T08:08:10.919Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).