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Evolutionary Stability Does Not Guarantee Learning Accessibility: A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Perspective on Cooperation Emergence — arXiv:2609.27664

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27664
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T09:11:29.066Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
d11b89d9a3f71aa5af99a8338afbdf5613ccac029e997475eeb127fb4b0e5894
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8d544efe6286

How to cite

Evolutionary Stability Does Not Guarantee Learning Accessibility: A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Perspective on Cooperation Emergence — arXiv:2609.27664 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27664 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8d544efe6286 (Metraipolis archive dc_8d544efe6286, sha256 d11b89d9a3f71aa5af99a8338afbdf5613ccac029e997475eeb127fb4b0e5894)
BibTeX
@misc{dc8d544efe6286,
  title = {Evolutionary Stability Does Not Guarantee Learning Accessibility: A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Perspective on Cooperation Emergence — arXiv:2609.27664},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27664},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8d544efe6286; sha256 d11b89d9a3f71aa5af99a8338afbdf5613ccac029e997475eeb127fb4b0e5894},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27664. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Cooperation emergence is a central problem in multi-agent systems because decentralized agents must coordinate while adapting to the changing behavior of others. Evolutionary game theory identifies strategically stable outcomes, but stability under a population adjustment dynamic need not imply that finite-sample learning agents can reach the same outcome through local reward feedback. We study this distinction in a transparent three-agent governance-motivated game involving a government, a platform firm, and users. We derive replicator dynamics for the fixed stage-game incentives, evaluate the cooperative evolutionary basin on a symmetric initial-condition grid, and compare it with learning-basin estimates for three decentralized value-based learners. The learning analysis uses independent Q-learning with $\varepsilon$-greedy action selection, scaled Boltzmann exploration, and SA--EA BQL under the same payoff environment and outcome criterion. The evolutionary basin has volume $V_E=1.00$ on the sampled grid. The empirical learning basin is $0.88$ for $\varepsilon$-IQL and $0.00$ for both scaled Boltzmann and SA--EA BQL. Diagnostic traces show that broader action diversity and nonzero value separation can coexist with failure to sustain the cooperative joint action in this fixed configuration. These results indicate that evolutionary stability and learning accessibility are distinct properties of a coupled game--learning system. The shared-bike setting is a motivating application; the broader contribution is a framework for comparing population-level stability with the finite-sample accessibility of cooperation under specified multi-agent learning dynamics.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-24 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27664 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T08:13:26.525Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).