Metraipolis › archive › dc_8c5cb35efd2e

A Dynamic Model of Party Differentiation under Electoral Competition — arXiv:2609.26568

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26568
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T15:52:36.530Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
a6f48f43b15857781d669f314fcdbce25aeef77dc58c5c0f8b6aaae053de8de8
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8c5cb35efd2e

How to cite

A Dynamic Model of Party Differentiation under Electoral Competition — arXiv:2609.26568 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26568 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8c5cb35efd2e (Metraipolis archive dc_8c5cb35efd2e, sha256 a6f48f43b15857781d669f314fcdbce25aeef77dc58c5c0f8b6aaae053de8de8)
BibTeX
@misc{dc8c5cb35efd2e,
  title = {A Dynamic Model of Party Differentiation under Electoral Competition — arXiv:2609.26568},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26568},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8c5cb35efd2e; sha256 a6f48f43b15857781d669f314fcdbce25aeef77dc58c5c0f8b6aaae053de8de8},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26568. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Why do political parties polarise when most voters remain in the centre? Moving beyond conventional point-based models, we address this classic puzzle by developing a spatial voting framework that conceptualises political parties as continuous ideological distributions. Operating under endogenous turnout, these parties adapt their positioning to maximise a combination of total votes and parliamentary representation. We demonstrate that this theoretical formulation reveals a distinct phase transition in multiparty competition, moving from centripetal convergence to centrifugal separation. These dual objectives do not necessarily reward the same directional party movement as voters only cast ballots for ideologically acceptable parties. The numerical results map the precise boundaries of this transition: a higher party count destabilises the centrist equilibrium and expands the zone of divergence, whereas pronounced internal party dispersion and a stronger emphasis on representation contract it. Furthermore, electoral institutions critically govern this divergence: when voter preferences vary across geographic districts, the same national electorate can trigger entirely different phase transitions depending on how votes are converted into seats. Together, our results show how party differentiation emerges endogenously from the dynamics of electoral competition itself. Whether small initial differences grow or decay is not merely a reflection of voter preferences, but an outcome dictated by party goals, competitor count, internal party breadth, and vote-to-seat conversion rules.

Tema degli esploratori: statistica e scienza dei dati (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-23 in stat.AP).
Categorie arXiv: Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) ; Applications (stat.AP).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26568 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T15:11:38.935Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/stat.AP/2026-09-23?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).