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Safety Verification for Voltage Control in Inverter Dominated Radial Distribution Networks under Actuator and Sensor Adversarial Attacks — arXiv:2610.41910
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41910
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T05:43:24.914Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
Safety Verification for Voltage Control in Inverter Dominated Radial Distribution Networks under Actuator and Sensor Adversarial Attacks — arXiv:2610.41910 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41910 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8be3156fb759 (Metraipolis archive dc_8be3156fb759, sha256 d0253ee5d287a9aeb798327ff87d4d77818f1fc05266691c3ed3003db68fd931)
BibTeX
@misc{dc8be3156fb759,
title = {Safety Verification for Voltage Control in Inverter Dominated Radial Distribution Networks under Actuator and Sensor Adversarial Attacks — arXiv:2610.41910},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41910},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8be3156fb759; sha256 d0253ee5d287a9aeb798327ff87d4d77818f1fc05266691c3ed3003db68fd931},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41910. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
This paper develops a safety verification framework for inverter-based radial distribution networks under sensor and actuator attacks. Each customer is equipped with a droop-based controller to regulate its voltage within a desirable bound of a reference, i.e., to achieve safety. In our setting, attacks and disturbances enter the droop-based controllers, while actuator attacks corrupt the reactive power injected into the network. Consequently, invariance of the controller state alone does not guarantee compliance with inverter capacities or customer voltage limits. To address this challenge, we derive conditions to guarantee that the reactive power state remains inside a predefined ellipsoid, while at the same time ensuring that the attacked reactive power injections and customer voltages respect predetermined operating limits that hold uniformly for the entire predefined ellipsoid. Together, these conditions guarantee safety under all admissible disturbances and state-dependent sensor and actuator attacks. Finally, we express the resulting containment condition as a linear matrix inequality (LMI) feasibility problem. A five-customer radial network based on the CIGRE benchmark corroborates our theoretical developments in simulations. Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (elenco arXiv math.OC, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Systems and Control (eess.SY) ; Optimization and Control (math.OC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41910 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T05:31:17.183Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/math.OC/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).