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TPM-Attest: Hardware-Rooted Integrity Attestation as a Kernel-Level Anti-Cheat Alternative for Linux — arXiv:2609.20909

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20909
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-10T01:43:41.699Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
43f4b6769affa1fd078a75c1567e70d5ab0ab32cb7b44408a6fc5e2f20a7d103
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8b247601b95e

How to cite

TPM-Attest: Hardware-Rooted Integrity Attestation as a Kernel-Level Anti-Cheat Alternative for Linux — arXiv:2609.20909 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20909 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8b247601b95e (Metraipolis archive dc_8b247601b95e, sha256 43f4b6769affa1fd078a75c1567e70d5ab0ab32cb7b44408a6fc5e2f20a7d103)
BibTeX
@misc{dc8b247601b95e,
  title = {TPM-Attest: Hardware-Rooted Integrity Attestation as a Kernel-Level Anti-Cheat Alternative for Linux — arXiv:2609.20909},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20909},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8b247601b95e; sha256 43f4b6769affa1fd078a75c1567e70d5ab0ab32cb7b44408a6fc5e2f20a7d103},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20909. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Multiplayer PC gaming on Linux faces a structural problem: the anti-cheat systems that publishers require operate as proprietary Ring 0 kernel modules that are architecturally incompatible with Linux's security model, GPL licensing, and stable ABI guarantees. We argue the right response is not to port these invasive modules to Linux, but to replace them entirely. This paper presents TPM-Attest, a hardware-rooted remote attestation framework that uses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 and the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) to prove, cryptographically, that a client booted cleanly and ran only authorised software -- without any kernel driver, without proprietary code, and without scanning player memory. The system intercepts Epic Online Services (EOS) SDK calls via a userspace LD_PRELOAD hook, gates session access on a live TPM quote bound to a server-issued nonce, and constructs an index-prefixed Merkle tree over the IMA log that is immune to duplicate-leaf collision attacks. Across 500 constructed tamper sessions we achieve a 100% detection rate; incremental leaf caching reduces repeat-attestation latency to under 3 seconds on real TPM 2.0 hardware. A controlled red-team evaluation against a live demo game confirms all four file-backed attack vectors are blocked while precisely characterising the two confirmed bypass conditions. The full implementation is released as open-source software.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-21 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20909 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-10T01:13:42.003Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-21?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).