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The Open-Strategy Dictator Game: Cooperation Under Mutual Transparency — arXiv:2608.14913

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14913
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-18T17:55:02.595Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: a9698099433d9f066c0189c72974b10469eb03f886b79c3d2208a5a96985439b
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8a54bdfbbfee

How to cite

The Open-Strategy Dictator Game: Cooperation Under Mutual Transparency — arXiv:2608.14913 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14913 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8a54bdfbbfee (Metraipolis archive dc_8a54bdfbbfee, sha256 a9698099433d9f066c0189c72974b10469eb03f886b79c3d2208a5a96985439b)

BibTeX

@misc{dc8a54bdfbbfee,
  title = {The Open-Strategy Dictator Game: Cooperation Under Mutual Transparency — arXiv:2608.14913},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14913},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8a54bdfbbfee; sha256 a9698099433d9f066c0189c72974b10469eb03f886b79c3d2208a5a96985439b},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14913. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We introduce the Open-Strategy Dictator Game (OSDG), a variant of the classic dictator game in which each player's strategy is a natural-language document visible to all participants. The dictator's decision, to SHARE or TAKE an endowment, may depend on the text of the recipient's strategy. A large language model adjudicates each interaction by interpreting the dictator's strategy in the context of the recipient's. We run round-robin tournaments among diverse strategies and analyze the resulting payoff matrix using softmax equilibrium frequencies, dominance analysis, and sensitivity to the relative value of cooperation. Conditionally cooperative strategies, those that share with cooperators and take from exploiters, consistently dominate, while unconditional strategies (always share or always take) are weakly dominated. The results suggest that in environments where agents can inspect each other's decision procedures, conditional cooperation is evolutionarily robust across a wide range of payoff parameters.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-18 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14913 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T16:29:13.964Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-08-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).