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CoRTeC: A Differentially Private Release for Synthetic Tabular Data, Decodable by Any Generator — arXiv:2611.06342

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06342
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-05T18:21:07.259Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
08bd659bcd51bb5f03c83a1738f10e5002bd24af47b345417968f0dff2d3c587
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_89b17bfa01cf

How to cite

CoRTeC: A Differentially Private Release for Synthetic Tabular Data, Decodable by Any Generator — arXiv:2611.06342 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06342 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_89b17bfa01cf (Metraipolis archive dc_89b17bfa01cf, sha256 08bd659bcd51bb5f03c83a1738f10e5002bd24af47b345417968f0dff2d3c587)
BibTeX
@misc{dc89b17bfa01cf,
  title = {CoRTeC: A Differentially Private Release for Synthetic Tabular Data, Decodable by Any Generator — arXiv:2611.06342},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06342},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_89b17bfa01cf; sha256 08bd659bcd51bb5f03c83a1738f10e5002bd24af47b345417968f0dff2d3c587},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06342. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The records that could train the most useful models, such as a hospital's patient files, are often the ones an institution cannot share. We propose CoRTeC, a method that releases synthetic versions of such records under differential privacy. Differential privacy places a proven limit on what the synthetic data can reveal about any person, and in particular on membership inference. CoRTeC spends the privacy budget once, on a small file of noisy counts designed for training a classifier. For each group of records, the file gives the group's size, its balance of outcomes, a histogram of every column for each outcome and the outcome rate in each of several non-overlapping cells. A reviewer can check every number before the file leaves the institution. Anyone can then turn the counts into synthetic rows, as often as they like and at no further privacy cost. A maximum-entropy decoder can do this without any language model, and so can each of the five frozen language models we tested. None of them ever sees a real record. A selection step then matches the rows to the released counts. Decoded without a language model, the automatically configured release at $\varepsilon = 2$ trains classifiers to within 0.02 AUC of a real sample of the same size on the Adult dataset, across three data splits. On NHANES and bank marketing, without the selection step, it stays within 0.05 AUC. On Adult, with a fixed cohort rule, the release carries the outcome rates a deployment names more closely than a real sample does, at some cost in accuracy on pairs of columns. Four controls show that most of the utility comes from the release and the selection step, and that a language model adds what it knows from the column names. No private row ever reaches a model, and no row CoRTeC generates copies a real one. The strongest membership attack stays far below the bound the budget allows.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06342 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-05T18:15:18.889Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).