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After Cheap Discovery: From unknown to known-and-unfixed — arXiv:2609.03266

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03266
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T02:03:58.332Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
4ba17df395af3357079ec1637c96021ee569e7cfbc84ca8fd0215a7d0ee3a52e
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_89770f45c83d

How to cite

After Cheap Discovery: From unknown to known-and-unfixed — arXiv:2609.03266 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03266 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_89770f45c83d (Metraipolis archive dc_89770f45c83d, sha256 4ba17df395af3357079ec1637c96021ee569e7cfbc84ca8fd0215a7d0ee3a52e)
BibTeX
@misc{dc89770f45c83d,
  title = {After Cheap Discovery: From unknown to known-and-unfixed — arXiv:2609.03266},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03266},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_89770f45c83d; sha256 4ba17df395af3357079ec1637c96021ee569e7cfbc84ca8fd0215a7d0ee3a52e},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03266. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Automated vulnerability discovery has removed the scarcity of expert attention that protected most software. The response has concentrated on discovery and on repair, and both are becoming cheaper. This article argues that neither cost curve determines exposure. What determines it is remediation coverage at the release decision: the fraction of identified vulnerabilities fixed before a product ships, and the residue of known, assessed, unremediated flaws an organisation has decided to ship with. Four arguments follow. The residue is not a random sample of what was found, because triage sorts on cost and the expensive cases are architectural. The deferred backlog is itself a high-value artifact. Documented awareness alters an organisation's legal and market position, and produces an adverse selection that the price of software does not reflect. And no regulatory instrument reaching vendors triggers on internal knowledge - every one fires on exploitation observed by a third party - which leaves the distance between what a vendor knows and what it must disclose entirely at the vendor's discretion. CISA's Binding Operational Directive 26-04 is examined as the exception that shows what a solution requires: a regulator's reach over a decision is bounded by its visibility of the input to that decision, so a duty attaching to internal knowledge needs an independent record of that knowledge to attach to. Release coverage is not currently measured, and measuring it is the precondition for liability, insurance or procurement to act.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-04 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03266 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T01:28:02.797Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-04?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).