Metraipolis › archive › dc_88b8dff8ecb0

UiAs: User-Independent 3D Facial Anti-Spoofing via Multi-modal Wireless Signals — arXiv:2608.29084

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29084
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T08:25:36.765Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
2c0756ab8669d94fd2a12c41c27f6250b41572e6438e665a7cb27e386ad9184c
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_88b8dff8ecb0

How to cite

UiAs: User-Independent 3D Facial Anti-Spoofing via Multi-modal Wireless Signals — arXiv:2608.29084 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29084 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_88b8dff8ecb0 (Metraipolis archive dc_88b8dff8ecb0, sha256 2c0756ab8669d94fd2a12c41c27f6250b41572e6438e665a7cb27e386ad9184c)
BibTeX
@misc{dc88b8dff8ecb0,
  title = {UiAs: User-Independent 3D Facial Anti-Spoofing via Multi-modal Wireless Signals — arXiv:2608.29084},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29084},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_88b8dff8ecb0; sha256 2c0756ab8669d94fd2a12c41c27f6250b41572e6438e665a7cb27e386ad9184c},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29084. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Face authentication is widely deployed in security-sensitive applications, while increasingly realistic 3D spoofing attacks pose growing threats. High-fidelity 3D masks can reproduce facial appearance and geometry but cannot replicate the intrinsic physical responses of living tissue, which can be actively probed by wireless signals. However, the resulting liveness cues captured by wireless signals are entangled with user-dependent facial geometry, limiting cross-user generalization. We present UiAs, a multimodal user-independent 3D facial anti-spoofing system using electromagnetic (mmWave) and mechanical (acoustic) waves. The two modalities share similar user-dependent geometric variations, allowing UiAs to suppress them through cross-modal subtraction while preserving modality-specific liveness cues. Their complementary physical responses further improve live/spoof discrimination. In practical deployments, multiple materials (e.g., skin, hair, eyeglasses, or face coverings) may also bias liveness representations, while spoofing materials are diverse and open-ended. UiAs addresses both through skin-anchored contrastive learning. We evaluate UiAs with real 3D spoofing attacks, which achieves 93.25\% accuracy for unseen users without user-specific physical-signal enrollment.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-01 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29084 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T08:10:59.858Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).