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Designing an Adaptive Robust and Evolutionary-Game Framework for Minimum Shipment Quotas in Capacity-Constrained Freight Markets — arXiv:2611.05364
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- arXiv (en)
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- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05364
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-04T21:56:07.696Z
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Designing an Adaptive Robust and Evolutionary-Game Framework for Minimum Shipment Quotas in Capacity-Constrained Freight Markets — arXiv:2611.05364 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05364 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_876bc9bceaee (Metraipolis archive dc_876bc9bceaee, sha256 c23f122196f794ddcd4735bdc23dd58b86e9dd2ca14483e850eb45256f897ace)
BibTeX
@misc{dc876bc9bceaee,
title = {Designing an Adaptive Robust and Evolutionary-Game Framework for Minimum Shipment Quotas in Capacity-Constrained Freight Markets — arXiv:2611.05364},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05364},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_876bc9bceaee; sha256 c23f122196f794ddcd4735bdc23dd58b86e9dd2ca14483e850eb45256f897ace},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05364. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Minimum shipment quota regulations ensure that socially critical commodities are not excluded from capacity-constrained freight markets by profit-driven allocation. Existing models of such regulation are deterministic and static, assuming perfect market knowledge and instantaneous convergence to a rational equilibrium. This paper relaxes both assumptions through a framework combining adaptive robust optimization, multi-objective optimization, and evolutionary game theory. A robust optimization model first characterizes the regulator's quota-setting problem under uncertain commodity availability, trading social welfare against enforcement cost to generate a Pareto frontier of quota policies. This frontier then defines the regulator's strategy space in a three-population evolutionary game in which the regulator, suppliers, and carrier co-evolve under replicator dynamics, so that the prevailing policy emerges from the interaction of the three players. The framework is calibrated to a Canadian rail freight case study that covers crude oil, corn, barley, and oat. Quota regulation raises social welfare from 65.0 to 288.2 million CAD, at an enforcement cost of about 2% of the gain. Two findings carry particular policy weight: capacity shortfalls fall entirely on unprotected commodities the carrier ships voluntarily, sparing both the highest-margin and the protected products; and a fall in transport cost can end the regulation while the exclusion it was designed to correct persists, because the margin observable before bidding diverges from the margin prevailing once suppliers adapt. Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (elenco arXiv math.OC, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05364 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-04T21:40:34.548Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/math.OC/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).