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Who Pays When Shared Infrastructure Fails? Zero Liquid Discharge, the Utilisation Trap, and the Incidence of Compliance Cost in India's Textile and Tannery Clusters — arXiv:2609.32377

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32377
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T22:14:28.989Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
9565e3dc1789e4c7fc9ef3357a051bf8bfdb7617e9a4e9e96d21cc431ca40c2d
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_86bb5b3e5309

How to cite

Who Pays When Shared Infrastructure Fails? Zero Liquid Discharge, the Utilisation Trap, and the Incidence of Compliance Cost in India's Textile and Tannery Clusters — arXiv:2609.32377 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32377 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_86bb5b3e5309 (Metraipolis archive dc_86bb5b3e5309, sha256 9565e3dc1789e4c7fc9ef3357a051bf8bfdb7617e9a4e9e96d21cc431ca40c2d)
BibTeX
@misc{dc86bb5b3e5309,
  title = {Who Pays When Shared Infrastructure Fails? Zero Liquid Discharge, the Utilisation Trap, and the Incidence of Compliance Cost in India's Textile and Tannery Clusters — arXiv:2609.32377},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32377},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_86bb5b3e5309; sha256 9565e3dc1789e4c7fc9ef3357a051bf8bfdb7617e9a4e9e96d21cc431ca40c2d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32377. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Many countries require factories to recycle almost all their wastewater and return none to rivers, a standard called zero liquid discharge (ZLD); in India, courts have imposed it on textile and leather clusters. Yet when enforcement tightens, small firms close while larger polluters often endure. This paper asks why, comparing Tirupur, where closures have already occurred, with Kanpur's Jajmau tanneries, where they are ongoing. Small firms depend on shared treatment plants they do not control. As these plants become underused, costs rise, performance declines, and firms with in-house treatment are better able to withstand enforcement. Because compliance is judged by equipment ownership rather than measured discharge, plant failure is attributed to member firms. This final step is the best evidenced, while the earlier links remain suggestive. The paper recommends judging compliance by measured discharge and determining whether the plant or the firm has failed before closure, so enforcement targets pollution rather than the firms least able to absorb it.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-29 in econ.GN).
Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32377 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T21:55:36.568Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-09-29?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).