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Reaction Attack on CKKS Deployments with Asymptotically Optimal Query Complexity — arXiv:2610.21127

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21127
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T10:19:16.978Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
15b31d71e800309e494921cc97d2e015dc5a28771f766127fd68494f77a8444c
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_85a161c5880b

How to cite

Reaction Attack on CKKS Deployments with Asymptotically Optimal Query Complexity — arXiv:2610.21127 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21127 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_85a161c5880b (Metraipolis archive dc_85a161c5880b, sha256 15b31d71e800309e494921cc97d2e015dc5a28771f766127fd68494f77a8444c)
BibTeX
@misc{dc85a161c5880b,
  title = {Reaction Attack on CKKS Deployments with Asymptotically Optimal Query Complexity — arXiv:2610.21127},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21127},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_85a161c5880b; sha256 15b31d71e800309e494921cc97d2e015dc5a28771f766127fd68494f77a8444c},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21127. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study a protocol-level reaction leakage in CKKS deployments where public coefficient-to-slot (C2S) evaluation keys are combined with a client's 1-bit validity response. Under this deployment surface, a malicious evaluator can recover a ternary secret key using asymptotically optimal $O(H)$ reaction queries, where $H$ is the entropy of the secret key. The attack does not break RLWE or CKKS IND-CPA security. Instead, it exploits the interaction between client-side validity reactions and public homomorphic linear transformations. A shift of a public encryption key yields a ciphertext whose plaintext is a function of the secret key; the public ${\sf C2S}$ layer then repacks this information to construct a ciphertext whose validity depends strictly on whether a targeted secret coefficient matches a guessed value. Furthermore, each submitted query is independently randomized with a fresh encryption of zero, so that each resulting malicious ciphertext appears entirely distinct, thereby allowing the attack to simply evade trivial detection mechanisms on the client side. We implemented the full end-to-end attack in Lattigo v6.2.0 and recovered the full secret key across four parameter sets drawn from standard CKKS presets. For uniform ternary secrets, the attack uses $O(N)$ queries and is within a factor $2/\log_2 3 < 2$ of the oracle-only entropy lower bound. For sparse ternary secrets, a tailored variant further reduces the number of queries in practice. Our results show that observable validity reactions form a practical key-recovery channel in CKKS deployments exposing this surface, even when the underlying cryptographic assumptions remain intact.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21127 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T08:47:32.596Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).