Metraipolis › archive › dc_8460e02e80f0

Finding Competitive Equilibria in Online Marketplaces with Platform Fees, Taxes, and Subsidies — arXiv:2610.40626

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40626
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-31T06:22:25.494Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
3843ec86a997ceaa78abf1f43b89b1266a109fbc8e5d9a6a69779a3784bdd20c
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8460e02e80f0

How to cite

Finding Competitive Equilibria in Online Marketplaces with Platform Fees, Taxes, and Subsidies — arXiv:2610.40626 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40626 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8460e02e80f0 (Metraipolis archive dc_8460e02e80f0, sha256 3843ec86a997ceaa78abf1f43b89b1266a109fbc8e5d9a6a69779a3784bdd20c)
BibTeX
@misc{dc8460e02e80f0,
  title = {Finding Competitive Equilibria in Online Marketplaces with Platform Fees, Taxes, and Subsidies — arXiv:2610.40626},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40626},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8460e02e80f0; sha256 3843ec86a997ceaa78abf1f43b89b1266a109fbc8e5d9a6a69779a3784bdd20c},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40626. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study equilibrium computation in multi-unit trading networks with valuations satisfying generalized full substitutes and agent- and transaction-specific piecewise-linear transfer functions. These transfers model platform fees, taxes, subsidies, and membership discounts in online marketplaces. Our ascending procedure raises prices at different rates and reaches the minimum equilibrium price vector in finitely many iterations, each implementable in strongly polynomial time under our oracle and arithmetic models. An equilibrium allocation can then be recovered efficiently. The method extends primal-dual techniques developed for ascending auctions to handle complementarities between purchases and sales through a submodular flow formulation. In single-seller markets with substitutes and complements, our framework also extends the double-track auctions of Sun and Yang (2009) and Shioura and Yang (2015) to bidder- and good-specific transfers.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40626 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T06:08:53.367Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).