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Principled Authority Switching for Shared Autonomy in Human-Robot Teams — arXiv:2608.16293

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16293
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-18T19:08:10.150Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 2f50dd2b1ef62a72c6f42ef79575bea76ef6d6ca455108ec3b29904d30d12c64
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8302aa1b97df

How to cite

Principled Authority Switching for Shared Autonomy in Human-Robot Teams — arXiv:2608.16293 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16293 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8302aa1b97df (Metraipolis archive dc_8302aa1b97df, sha256 2f50dd2b1ef62a72c6f42ef79575bea76ef6d6ca455108ec3b29904d30d12c64)

BibTeX

@misc{dc8302aa1b97df,
  title = {Principled Authority Switching for Shared Autonomy in Human-Robot Teams — arXiv:2608.16293},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16293},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_8302aa1b97df; sha256 2f50dd2b1ef62a72c6f42ef79575bea76ef6d6ca455108ec3b29904d30d12c64},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16293. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Shared autonomy requires principled mechanisms for allocating and transferring control between a human and an autonomous agent. Existing approaches often rely on blending control inputs or heuristic switching rules, which lack theoretical guarantees and fail to account for the dynamics of authority transfer. This paper develops a cooperative game-theoretic framework for authority switching in shared autonomy. We formulate the control switching problem as an identical-interest dynamic game in which authority transitions are embedded into the system dynamics, yielding optimal switching policies rather than ad hoc rules. We establish the existence and characterization of team-optimal policies in pure strategies under stochastic human override, accounting for asymmetric authority where humans retain override capability. For linear-quadratic systems, we derive closed-form recursions for the optimal switching policies and value functions, enabling efficient computation independent of the continuous state. We validate the framework on scalar and multi-dimensional linear systems, demonstrating how optimal switching adapts to varying system dynamics, cost structures, and override probabilities. The results reveal fundamental trade-offs between human adaptability and autonomous efficiency, illustrating the practical benefits of grounding shared autonomy in cooperative game theory.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-18 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Systems and Control (eess.SY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16293 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T18:12:50.759Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).