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Beyond the Quantum Promise: A Security Analysis of Classical Control in Quantum Key Distribution — arXiv:2608.07626
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07626
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T08:58:28.726Z
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Beyond the Quantum Promise: A Security Analysis of Classical Control in Quantum Key Distribution — arXiv:2608.07626 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07626 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_82e884def148 (Metraipolis archive dc_82e884def148, sha256 8faf31b70960ad356f6c0a30b409ea6a8c30232103b04abe5b1202874ba71408)
BibTeX
@misc{dc82e884def148,
title = {Beyond the Quantum Promise: A Security Analysis of Classical Control in Quantum Key Distribution — arXiv:2608.07626},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07626},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_82e884def148; sha256 8faf31b70960ad356f6c0a30b409ea6a8c30232103b04abe5b1202874ba71408},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07626. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols provide information-theoretic security by using quantum mechanical principles. Yet QKD is fundamentally a hybrid protocol: its security depends on the correct integration of the quantum phase with classical post-processing. While ETSI and ITUT specifications standardize QKD architectures and interfaces, they evaluate protocol security in isolation, leaving cross-layer interactions as an underexplored attack surface. This paper introduces a formal verification framework that holistically models QKD protocols based on ETSI and ITUT QKD specifications. Our model is the first hybrid QKD protocol model that supports automated analysis of protocollevel security focusing on how classical operations influence the security guarantees provided by the quantum phase of the QKD protocol. We formalize a comprehensive symbolic model of QKD protocols, based on ETSI and ITU-T QKD specifications, in Tamarin, an automated protocol verifier. Applying this framework, we obtain formal evidence of three specification-level vulnerabilities in ETSI- and ITU-T-grounded protocol models under adversary Eve+: subverted entanglement injection, basis-deferred measurement, and message reflection. Each arises from a classical control-plane omission in the procedure text and is established under a symbolic abstraction rather than as a claim about all practical deployments. We introduce two protocol improvements: measurement commitment and identitybound message authentication codes (MACs). Tamarin verification confirms that these countermeasures eliminate the identified vulnerabilities under Eve+. We have communicated our results and recommendations to relevant standardization organizations. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-11 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Quantum Physics (quant-ph) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Symbolic Computation (cs.SC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07626 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T08:54:24.984Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).