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Attack-Resiliency Analytics for Wide-Area Control Systems in Smart Grids — arXiv:2609.36583

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36583
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T20:48:57.120Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
88e1647e8605565d08f15aa9403e02d9807e231feb164e10d7dbba94f6ff1cde
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_82cd4b9eaf34

How to cite

Attack-Resiliency Analytics for Wide-Area Control Systems in Smart Grids — arXiv:2609.36583 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36583 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_82cd4b9eaf34 (Metraipolis archive dc_82cd4b9eaf34, sha256 88e1647e8605565d08f15aa9403e02d9807e231feb164e10d7dbba94f6ff1cde)
BibTeX
@misc{dc82cd4b9eaf34,
  title = {Attack-Resiliency Analytics for Wide-Area Control Systems in Smart Grids — arXiv:2609.36583},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36583},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_82cd4b9eaf34; sha256 88e1647e8605565d08f15aa9403e02d9807e231feb164e10d7dbba94f6ff1cde},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36583. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) systems damp inter-area oscillations in large interconnected grids, but their reliance on synchronized PMU measurements carried over wide-area networks exposes them to false data injection (FDI) attacks. This paper presents an attack-resiliency analytics framework that formally models the coupled dynamics of the wide-area damping loop, automatic generation control, and the governor and excitation systems, and formulates the optimal stealthy FDI attack as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP). The anomaly detection model (ADM) enters as a replaceable constraint set: either a static bad-data detection (BDD) rule or a boundary learned from benign operation calibrated to a common false-positive rate. On the IEEE 39 and 118 bus systems, with reference dynamics validated on an OPAL-RT hardware-in-the-loop testbed, the optimal attack with wide-area access attains 3.3 and 8.1 times the benign objective and reaches a 0.5Hz frequency excursion more than twice as fast as an attack confined to automatic generation control. Learned boundaries reduce the attack objective by 15.5 55.0% and prevent over-frequency relay trips in all configurations, with feasible stealthy attacks remaining in every case, and residual risk tracks the width of the learned boundary rather than the detector family.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-30 in eess.SY).
Categorie arXiv: Systems and Control (eess.SY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36583 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T20:07:11.916Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/eess.SY/2026-09-30?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).