Metraipolis › archive › dc_81ba0ebb5bcb
FIXP-Completeness in Second-Price Auctions — arXiv:2611.00543
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00543
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T11:14:57.337Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
52dfe13042501b250a8f3647eea7581e128629a39645debb385d8cf2742f52b3- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_81ba0ebb5bcb
How to cite
FIXP-Completeness in Second-Price Auctions — arXiv:2611.00543 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00543 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_81ba0ebb5bcb (Metraipolis archive dc_81ba0ebb5bcb, sha256 52dfe13042501b250a8f3647eea7581e128629a39645debb385d8cf2742f52b3)
BibTeX
@misc{dc81ba0ebb5bcb,
title = {FIXP-Completeness in Second-Price Auctions — arXiv:2611.00543},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00543},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_81ba0ebb5bcb; sha256 52dfe13042501b250a8f3647eea7581e128629a39645debb385d8cf2742f52b3},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00543. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Computing equilibria is a fundamental algorithmic problem in game theory and economics. Although general frameworks are available for proving membership in FIXP, the class capturing exact fixed-point computation, establishing FIXP-completeness often remains challenging. We prove FIXP-completeness of exact equilibrium computation in three second-price auction models: (1). pacing with return-on-investment constraints, with multiplier cap $1+\delta$ for every fixed rational $\delta>0$ [Filos-Ratsikas, Hansen, Høgh, and Hollender (2024)]; (2). budget-constrained generalized second-price sponsored shopping [Hansen, Li, and Nie (2026)]; (3). budget-constrained throttling [Liu (2026)]. These results resolve open questions on the exact complexity of automated bidding. Our technical ingredient is a FIXP-complete generalized-circuit problem using only clipped affine gates and the reciprocal $x\mapsto1/(1+\tau x)$, for any fixed positive rational $\tau$. This gate basis provides a common framework for the three auction reductions: simulating these gates in each model establishes FIXP-hardness without directly implementing multiplication or squaring. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Computational Complexity (cs.CC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00543 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T11:01:07.148Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).