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Candidate Resignation Monotonicity in Approval-Based Committee Elections — arXiv:2608.06156
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06156
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-26T20:01:43.968Z
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Candidate Resignation Monotonicity in Approval-Based Committee Elections — arXiv:2608.06156 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06156 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_80d65fe98271 (Metraipolis archive dc_80d65fe98271, sha256 bdbcb990a904dbbd1879a8f5e67f197d7620e20f98713147e538439c84fdc397)
BibTeX
@misc{dc80d65fe98271,
title = {Candidate Resignation Monotonicity in Approval-Based Committee Elections — arXiv:2608.06156},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06156},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_80d65fe98271; sha256 bdbcb990a904dbbd1879a8f5e67f197d7620e20f98713147e538439c84fdc397},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06156. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Approval-based committee (ABC) elections select a fixed-size committee of candidates based on voters' approval preferences. We study a setting where elected members may resign and formalize resignation monotonicity: when we re-run the voting rule after resignations, a resignation monotone rule must still elect all remaining previously winning candidates. We show that many prominent ABC rules fail this property, and by connecting our notion to prior work on ABC elections with dynamic candidate sets, we show that the justified representation (JR) axiom is incompatible with resignation monotonicity. It turns out that fractional committee voting does not suffer from this issue: rules based on using maximum flows in the network representation of an election instance can satisfy both representation axioms and resignation monotonicity. We design an integral version of maximum flow, the Maximum Payment Rule (MPR), and show that it satisfies a relaxed form of resignation monotonicity that only requires there to be some way of replacing the resigning candidates in a way that guarantees the PJR+ axiom. MPR is NP-hard to compute in general, but becomes tractable in structured domains. Finally, we study a strategic setting where a losing candidate may introduce new weak candidates to the election to try to become a winner. We show that all resignation monotone rules as well as many sequential rules are immune, but that the PAV rule can be manipulated in this way. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-07 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06156 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-26T19:47:33.605Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).