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System-Level Factors Influencing AGC Cyber-Attack Success and RAS Vulnerability in Multi-Area Grids — arXiv:2610.42047

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42047
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-11-02T08:13:56.319Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 589458b88a3c715929314841285319a48ba15de6012fbc2a8236f5b8f9eaf8b7
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_80aca39ec2bf

How to cite

System-Level Factors Influencing AGC Cyber-Attack Success and RAS Vulnerability in Multi-Area Grids — arXiv:2610.42047 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42047 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_80aca39ec2bf (Metraipolis archive dc_80aca39ec2bf, sha256 589458b88a3c715929314841285319a48ba15de6012fbc2a8236f5b8f9eaf8b7)

BibTeX

@misc{dc80aca39ec2bf,
  title = {System-Level Factors Influencing AGC Cyber-Attack Success and RAS Vulnerability in Multi-Area Grids — arXiv:2610.42047},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42047},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_80aca39ec2bf; sha256 589458b88a3c715929314841285319a48ba15de6012fbc2a8236f5b8f9eaf8b7},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42047. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Automatic generation control (AGC) stabilizes frequency and scheduled power exchanges among interconnected areas, yet its reliance on communication networks introduces cyber-vulnerabilities. This work examines coordinated AGC cyber-attacks in the presence of remedial action schemes (RAS) and identifies operating conditions under which an attacker can drive grid frequency beyond safe limits while evading RAS. A feedback-based attack policy is used to manipulate AGC signals and steer system frequency toward unsafe trajectories. Then, a large nested-loop parametric sweep---spanning attacked-area inertia relative to its interconnected neighboring area, AGC capacity versus maximum tie-line transfer, AGC update rate, load damping, and bi-directional power transfers---generates over 1.45 million scenarios. These are classified using a decision tree to establish guidelines to distinguish successful from unsuccessful attacks based on frequency deviations. The resulting vulnerability guidelines are validated on a three-area system using phasor-domain simulations with IEEE 9-bus area models, detailed turbine--governor dynamics, and under/over-frequency load and generation shedding. Results show that specific combinations of AGC capacity, inertia distribution, and pre-attack tie-line loading increase the likelihood of successful attacks, offering operators actionable criteria for identifying vulnerable operating conditions.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv eess.SY, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Systems and Control (eess.SY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42047 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-02T07:52:46.319Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/eess.SY/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).