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Persuasion by Parts — arXiv:2611.02845
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T18:28:50.741Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
5319e8f4cf597bcc0e870ef4e06a1a0656b813696202ba7b4eacf355916076bd- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Persuasion by Parts — arXiv:2611.02845 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_80149dff8707 (Metraipolis archive dc_80149dff8707, sha256 5319e8f4cf597bcc0e870ef4e06a1a0656b813696202ba7b4eacf355916076bd)
BibTeX
@misc{dc80149dff8707,
title = {Persuasion by Parts — arXiv:2611.02845},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_80149dff8707; sha256 5319e8f4cf597bcc0e870ef4e06a1a0656b813696202ba7b4eacf355916076bd},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Classical Bayesian persuasion assumes that an information designer can condition signals on the entire state. We propose persuasion by parts. In this model, the receiver's payoff from acting is $X = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$ for independent coordinates $X_1,\ldots,X_n$ observed by separate sources. The designer commits in advance to a product experiment, in which each source $i$ can condition its signal only on $X_i$. Given the signals, the receiver computes her posterior mean $y$ of $X$ and acts with probability $g(y)$, where $g\colon \mathbb{R} \to [0,1]$ is a nondecreasing function. The designer aims to maximize the probability of action. Let $V_{\mathrm{prod}}(g)$ and $V_{\mathrm{joint}}(g)$ be the supremum probabilities of action under persuasion by parts and under joint persuasion, respectively. When the designer knows $g$, we show $$ V_{\mathrm{prod}}(g) \;\ge\; c\,V_{\mathrm{joint}}(g)^2 \qquad\text{for every nondecreasing } g\colon \mathbb{R} \to [0,1], $$ where $c > 0$ is an absolute constant independent of $n$ and the prior; the exponent $2$ is tight. When $g$ is unknown, we construct a product experiment $\Pi$ from the prior alone, whose probability of action $V_\Pi(g)$ satisfies $$ V_\Pi(g) \;\ge\; c_\varepsilon\,V_{\mathrm{joint}}(g)^{2 + \varepsilon} \qquad\text{for every } \varepsilon > 0 \text{ and every nondecreasing } g\colon \mathbb{R} \to [0,1], $$ where $c_\varepsilon > 0$ depends only on $\varepsilon$.
Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:11:22.756Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).