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Fragmented Obedient Equilibria in Routing Games — arXiv:2610.39225

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39225
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-31T06:22:24.671Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
797fa509b9e120b0b911ef1a4c8f43daafdf6788a0db7a49c1ce109d43e30b7b
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7f178981b4dc

How to cite

Fragmented Obedient Equilibria in Routing Games — arXiv:2610.39225 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39225 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7f178981b4dc (Metraipolis archive dc_7f178981b4dc, sha256 797fa509b9e120b0b911ef1a4c8f43daafdf6788a0db7a49c1ce109d43e30b7b)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7f178981b4dc,
  title = {Fragmented Obedient Equilibria in Routing Games — arXiv:2610.39225},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39225},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7f178981b4dc; sha256 797fa509b9e120b0b911ef1a4c8f43daafdf6788a0db7a49c1ce109d43e30b7b},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39225. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study routing games in which competing mediators recommend routes to fixed nonatomic populations. Each mediator chooses a randomized flow allocation to minimize its population's expected travel cost, subject to users having no conditional expected gain above a tolerance $\epsilon$ from disregarding their recommendations. We define a fragmented obedient equilibrium (FOE) by combining user obedience with mediator optimality, and establish existence under a lower-hemicontinuity assumption on the obedient policy correspondences. Under affine edge latencies and independent mediator sampling, we derive an exact reformulation in first and second flow moments that preserves best responses and equilibrium profiles. Every feasible moment pair admits a finitely supported realizing policy. When the network has at most four routes, each mediator's best-response problem is an exact semidefinite program. A numerical illustration on the Braess network shows that relaxing obedience can reduce FOE costs, while gaps relative to the social optimum and optimal obedient pooling can persist.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39225 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T06:08:53.365Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).