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Regret, equilibrium, and learning in games: A guided tour — arXiv:2608.09389

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09389
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T08:55:48.810Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
ad7268cfdc5871db599ac39a06bf1047ccaec50bec61023f5296fb59f9d25e61
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7ed73af8ca33

How to cite

Regret, equilibrium, and learning in games: A guided tour — arXiv:2608.09389 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09389 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7ed73af8ca33 (Metraipolis archive dc_7ed73af8ca33, sha256 ad7268cfdc5871db599ac39a06bf1047ccaec50bec61023f5296fb59f9d25e61)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7ed73af8ca33,
  title = {Regret, equilibrium, and learning in games: A guided tour — arXiv:2608.09389},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09389},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7ed73af8ca33; sha256 ad7268cfdc5871db599ac39a06bf1047ccaec50bec61023f5296fb59f9d25e61},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09389. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond. Our presentation is structured around two complementary viewpoints: We first consider a single agent -- the learner -- engaged in a sequential decision process in an unknown, non-stationary, and possibly adversarial environment. We then examine what happens when the environment is shaped by the decisions of several interacting agents, not necessarily aware of each other's actions or goals, and all seeking to improve their individual rewards. In this general context, we examine a family of regularized learning policies based on best-responding to the past history of play, up to a regularization penalty intended to encourage exploration and prevent over-commitment to suboptimal choices. In the single-agent setting, we present some basic regret bounds for regularized learning in adversarial multi-armed bandits; in the multi-agent setting, we describe an ergodic equilibrium convergence result for zero-sum games in the spirit of classical results on fictitious play, as well as a "folk theorem" linking strategic and dynamic notions of stability -- Nash equilibria and attracting points of regularized learning, respectively. We pay special attention to the information available to the players and, through a unified analysis framework, we study both oracle- and payoff-based (bandit) methods. Our goal is to provide a coherent and comprehensible -- albeit, by necessity, not comprehensive -- account of some recent ideas in the field, and to discuss their implications for the study of rationality.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-11 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG); Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09389 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T08:52:22.696Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).