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Understanding the Privacy-Preserving Potential of HTTP/2 Against Webpage Fingerprinting — arXiv:2609.05119

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05119
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T22:51:19.995Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f477df6d0e6869f315b724a73d1c702eb3c9a9ab67ad9d76f4e5f7d0ef1a988c
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7e40bf23acd2

How to cite

Understanding the Privacy-Preserving Potential of HTTP/2 Against Webpage Fingerprinting — arXiv:2609.05119 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05119 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7e40bf23acd2 (Metraipolis archive dc_7e40bf23acd2, sha256 f477df6d0e6869f315b724a73d1c702eb3c9a9ab67ad9d76f4e5f7d0ef1a988c)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7e40bf23acd2,
  title = {Understanding the Privacy-Preserving Potential of HTTP/2 Against Webpage Fingerprinting — arXiv:2609.05119},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05119},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7e40bf23acd2; sha256 f477df6d0e6869f315b724a73d1c702eb3c9a9ab67ad9d76f4e5f7d0ef1a988c},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05119. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks can infer which webpage a user visits from encrypted HTTPS traffic alone, compromising privacy even without decryption. WF defenses commonly shape traffic through noise, padding, delays, or flow splitting, yet they are most often studied from the perspective of encapsulating protocols like Tor or VPN rather than at the application layer (HTTP). In this work, we focus on application-layer defenses enabled by the most widely deployed version of HTTP, HTTP/2. We demonstrate how known defenses can be emulated through HTTP/2 features at the client side (HTTPOS, LLaMA, FRONT, Tamaraw) and the server side (ALPaCA, Tamaraw). We further show that HTTP/2 features, such as proactive resource suggestion, multiplexing, and flow control, offer untapped potential for lightweight yet effective defenses deployable at both endpoints. We evaluate these defenses using a unified blueprint that calibrates defense parameters per dataset, then combines practical attacks, information-theoretic leakage estimates, and overhead measurements. For each defense, this framework identifies the strongest hyperparameter-tuned fingerprinting model and estimates the residual uncertainty induced by the defense using two information-theoretic leakage estimators, all while accounting for the defense's privacy-overhead trade-offs.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-07 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05119 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T22:30:54.319Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).