Metraipolis › archive › dc_7e3bdc93efef

SatBleed: Security of Commoditized Communication Modules in Satellites — arXiv:2610.06258

Source
arXiv
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06258
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T05:29:57.303Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
3762cab2a7171321ca6e8c27a36e5e49b01d9a2f3ecf79977a8681f18c85f691
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7e3bdc93efef

How to cite

SatBleed: Security of Commoditized Communication Modules in Satellites — arXiv:2610.06258 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06258 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7e3bdc93efef (Metraipolis archive dc_7e3bdc93efef, sha256 3762cab2a7171321ca6e8c27a36e5e49b01d9a2f3ecf79977a8681f18c85f691)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7e3bdc93efef,
  title = {SatBleed: Security of Commoditized Communication Modules in Satellites — arXiv:2610.06258},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06258},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7e3bdc93efef; sha256 3762cab2a7171321ca6e8c27a36e5e49b01d9a2f3ecf79977a8681f18c85f691},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06258. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Substantial reduction in launch and manufacturing costs has resulted in the accelerated deployment of small satellite missions, with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components becoming the prevailing standard for specific subsystems. However, this modular architecture introduces critical security risks, most notably in the Communication Subsystem (COM), which is continuously exposed by design and implicitly trusted as the entry point for command and control. We construct a tailored threat taxonomy for attacks targeting the COM subsystem and analyze representative COM systems from various vendors. Our findings uncover severe vulnerabilities across firmware, protocols, and architectural designs. This work presents the first in-depth security evaluation of widely deployed COTS COM modules employed in small satellites, identifying vulnerabilities affecting dozens of missions. To assess the real-world impact, we correlate our discoveries with open-source telemetry data, inferring at least 28 vulnerable missions in orbit that are susceptible to hostile takeover. Our work reveals that satellite COM subsystems form an attractive and dangerously neglected attack surface, necessitating urgent attention from the community.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06258 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T05:26:35.370Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).