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Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption — arXiv:2609.31744
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31744
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T01:34:02.800Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption — arXiv:2609.31744 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31744 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7e1ecce92a07 (Metraipolis archive dc_7e1ecce92a07, sha256 42069a173eb0e77471e67d9c5fc0836a73ccdee66c131c30037afbdbdccd6920)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7e1ecce92a07,
title = {Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption — arXiv:2609.31744},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31744},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7e1ecce92a07; sha256 42069a173eb0e77471e67d9c5fc0836a73ccdee66c131c30037afbdbdccd6920},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31744. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Public support for early adoption can affect what later users learn from observed choices. An adopter may have favourable private information, or may have received a rebate. We study a government that randomly assigns eligibility for a fixed rebate and chooses the program's coverage and reporting rule. We characterize when disclosing individual eligibility changes optimal coverage from zero to a positive rate under general convex program costs. This requires both a favourable marginal return to a disclosed program and a bound on the direct benefit available from a large opaque intervention. In the benchmark, disclosure allows the government to increase early adoption and welfare while leaving expected total adoption unchanged. We then allow imperfect compliance and private information for the late user. An eligibility label can be strictly informative without changing anyone's decision, in which case disclosure has no welfare value. The policy reversal survives when both extensions are present. The results identify when an eligibility record is a useful part of the design of an adoption program. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-29 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31744 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T01:08:28.825Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-29?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).