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Differential Trust: Dynamic Multi-Authority Anonymous Credentials with Epoch-Weighted Updates — arXiv:2609.18811
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18811
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-15T14:31:43.116Z
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Differential Trust: Dynamic Multi-Authority Anonymous Credentials with Epoch-Weighted Updates — arXiv:2609.18811 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18811 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7df49248ed4d (Metraipolis archive dc_7df49248ed4d, sha256 c83e33e9aec4002a79dc9f9fdb256a062010043d5788eb07b4c2bbed0ac18062)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7df49248ed4d,
title = {Differential Trust: Dynamic Multi-Authority Anonymous Credentials with Epoch-Weighted Updates — arXiv:2609.18811},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18811},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7df49248ed4d; sha256 c83e33e9aec4002a79dc9f9fdb256a062010043d5788eb07b4c2bbed0ac18062},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18811. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Anonymous credentials (ACs) are fundamental to privacy-preserving authentication, allowing users to prove possession of attributes without revealing their identities. State-of-the-art ACs distribute credential issuance across multiple authorities, typically employing techniques such as Shamir's secret sharing or aggregate signatures. While this approach enhances system robustness and eliminates a single point of failure, it treats all authorities equally in the credential issuance phase. This uniform treatment disregards the varying levels of trustworthiness or stake held by different authorities. Such a limitation has become particularly problematic in modern decentralized systems like Proof-of-Stake networks, where the inherent trust differentiation among nodes cannot be leveraged in the credential issuance process. To address this limitation, we propose the notion of Multi-Authority Anonymous Credentials with Epoch-Based Weights (MA-ACEW), the first Multi-Authority Anonymous Credential (MA-AC) model that considers authorities' weight distribution in credential issuance. Crucially, MA-ACEW enables efficient credential updates when authority weight distributions change across epochs. The core of MA-ACEW is our novel Epoch-Bound Pointcheval-Sanders Signature (EB-PS) primitive, which binds signatures to specific time epochs. This temporal binding enables both weight-based credential issuance within epochs and efficient non-interactive credential updates across epochs. We formalize the EUF-eCMA unforgeability requirement for EB-PS and prove our construction satisfies it under a novel STB-GPS assumption. We then prove that our MA-ACEW construction achieves unforgeability, anonymity, and blindness. Finally, we present benchmarks demonstrating the efficiency of EB-PS and MA-ACEW. Remarkably, presenting a credential aggregated from 128 partial ones takes only 10.68 ms on average. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-17 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18811 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-15T13:56:52.867Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).