Metraipolis › archive › dc_7cacf1da4155
Defense Feedback and Global-Game Selection — arXiv:2610.00323
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00323
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T12:30:04.896Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
84b4c017a4b2f7304e807faedc2691ee3b8a57a8c607bc5a722a63458238949f- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7cacf1da4155
How to cite
Defense Feedback and Global-Game Selection — arXiv:2610.00323 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00323 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7cacf1da4155 (Metraipolis archive dc_7cacf1da4155, sha256 84b4c017a4b2f7304e807faedc2691ee3b8a57a8c607bc5a722a63458238949f)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7cacf1da4155,
title = {Defense Feedback and Global-Game Selection — arXiv:2610.00323},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00323},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7cacf1da4155; sha256 84b4c017a4b2f7304e807faedc2691ee3b8a57a8c607bc5a722a63458238949f},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00323. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Global games select a unique cutoff when a player's incentive moves monotonically with private information. We show that this logic can fail when a privately informed participant can take a costly, simultaneous, and unobserved action that defends the status quo. In a currency-attack model, the defender acts only at intermediate signals. Along the traders' cutoff equation, this interval response creates an endogenous defense-loss term that vanishes at the endpoints of an activation component but can dominate the decreasing benchmark payoff margin in between. We establish a primitive region in which defense is inactive and uniqueness survives, and a finite-CDF overshoot condition under which two active-defense cutoff roots coexist with the inactive benchmark root. Because marginal indifference need not imply global incentives, we also give sufficient conditions for a genuine monotone cutoff best response. Finally, outward-rounded interval arithmetic proves that a proper-prior parameter vector has exactly three symmetric monotone-cutoff equilibria and that this topology persists locally. The result isolates a payoff-based boundary of global-game selection: hidden intervention can restore multiplicity without public signalling or a perturbation of the information hierarchy. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-02 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00323 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T12:02:48.878Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-10-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).