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The Limits of Rank-Dependent Priorities in School Choice — arXiv:2609.39425
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39425
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T16:04:20.076Z
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The Limits of Rank-Dependent Priorities in School Choice — arXiv:2609.39425 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39425 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7c2874225edd (Metraipolis archive dc_7c2874225edd, sha256 0cbeae6b192de13f853a89960c0f7bd0f5d50816412e749017e9a381046a0914)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7c2874225edd,
title = {The Limits of Rank-Dependent Priorities in School Choice — arXiv:2609.39425},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39425},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7c2874225edd; sha256 0cbeae6b192de13f853a89960c0f7bd0f5d50816412e749017e9a381046a0914},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39425. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Many school choice mechanisms give students higher priority at schools they rank highly and aim to reward students' eagerness. This paper studies whether a centralized mechanism can incorporate such rank-dependent priorities while preserving truthful reporting. I consider a mechanism that jointly specifies how reported preferences modify schools' original priorities and how assignments are determined based on the modified priorities. I require the modification rule to satisfy rank monotonicity and the resulting matching to be stable with respect to the modified priorities. These two requirements jointly capture the policy objective of rewarding eagerness. My main result shows that any mechanism satisfying these requirements as well as strategy-proofness is outcome equivalent to the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism using the original priorities. Thus, if eagerness affects the outcome while the rank-dependent policy goal is maintained, the mechanism must be manipulable. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-01 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39425 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T15:37:43.273Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-10-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).