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Pacing Equilibria in Abstract Mechanisms — arXiv:2609.27285
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27285
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T10:08:07.780Z
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Pacing Equilibria in Abstract Mechanisms — arXiv:2609.27285 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27285 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7bcced3d8adb (Metraipolis archive dc_7bcced3d8adb, sha256 277cc73c3109b27a75f1d9a225d9db34f91b6d41bffeb62e5580e4a0163c617d)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7bcced3d8adb,
title = {Pacing Equilibria in Abstract Mechanisms — arXiv:2609.27285},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27285},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7bcced3d8adb; sha256 277cc73c3109b27a75f1d9a225d9db34f91b6d41bffeb62e5580e4a0163c617d},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27285. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Digital platforms increasingly rely on automated budget-management systems to regulate participation across allocation opportunities. A common tool is multiplicative pacing, which scales buyers' bids so that campaign-level budgets are spent gradually. Although pacing is operationally simple, its aggregate behavior depends on the underlying mechanism. In first-price single-item auction markets, pacing enjoys strong structural and computational properties that often fail in second-price auctions. It is unclear whether these properties extend to richer platform mechanisms. We develop a unified theory of pacing equilibria across a hierarchy of mechanisms. We first show that, even in first-price position auctions, the market-equilibrium interpretation of the single-item benchmark can fail. We then identify bid-maximizing pay-your-bid mechanisms as a broad class in which pacing equilibria exist, are unique, and admit an Eisenberg-Gale-type convex-program characterization. This implies efficient computation, Pareto-efficiency, and liquid-welfare guarantees, enabling pacing integration into large-scale optimization-based allocation routines. Finally, for abstract mechanisms satisfying a payment monotonicity condition, we prove equilibrium existence by smoothing discontinuities. With additional conditions and appropriate tie-breaking, we obtain uniqueness, revenue maximality among budget-feasible pacing vectors, and shill-proof implementability, and provide convergent budget-adjustment dynamics for approximate equilibria. Overall, many favorable properties of first-price pacing extend beyond single-item auctions under appropriate mechanism-level conditions. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-24 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27285 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T09:15:27.385Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).