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PIMROP: A Feasibility Study of Return-Oriented Programming on Commercial Processing-in-Memory Architectures — arXiv:2611.06036

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06036
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-05T18:19:35.047Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
d886978496dd4401100d3c9256f360442a6720fb5923f18b376953640f79358a
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7ac6b03290db

How to cite

PIMROP: A Feasibility Study of Return-Oriented Programming on Commercial Processing-in-Memory Architectures — arXiv:2611.06036 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06036 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7ac6b03290db (Metraipolis archive dc_7ac6b03290db, sha256 d886978496dd4401100d3c9256f360442a6720fb5923f18b376953640f79358a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7ac6b03290db,
  title = {PIMROP: A Feasibility Study of Return-Oriented Programming on Commercial Processing-in-Memory Architectures — arXiv:2611.06036},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06036},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7ac6b03290db; sha256 d886978496dd4401100d3c9256f360442a6720fb5923f18b376953640f79358a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06036. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Processing-in-Memory places small programmable cores on the memory device, where they execute beside the DRAM banks and beyond the control-flow defenses that protect host programs. The security of this in-memory code is an attack surface that remains largely unstudied. We present PIMROP, to our knowledge the first demonstrated code-reuse attack on a commercial Processing in-Memory ISA. We show that return-oriented programming is feasible on a real, commercially shipped PIM instruction set, the UPMEM DPU, whose DRAM Processing Units run C compiled by a dedicated LLVM toolchain. We build Galileo-for-DPU, a gadget scanner adapted to the DPU's fixed-width, 8-byte-aligned RISC encoding, and run it entirely on the UPMEM functional simulator in a reproducible Docker and VM environment. We find the runtime library that every kernel links already yields 517 non-trivial gadgets covering all five canonical ROP primitive classes, and all 13 PrIM benchmarks we scanned carry gadgets as well. We then demonstrate two verified end-to-end attacks, each reproducible on 10 of 10 runs. In the first, a stack buffer overflow in a DPU kernel overwrites the saved return address and diverts control into a routine that copies a secret into host-readable memory. In the second, we leak the same secret using a chain of reused gadgets alone, without diverting control into any such routine. We further show that two standard defenses--stack canaries and _FORTIFY_SOURCE-style bounds-check fortification--fail on the DPU in ways specific to the platform (misplaced canary, silently inactive wrapper), and we verify a bounds-checked DMA that stops the attack on 10 of 10 runs with no effect on benign requests. To enable further research on PIM security, we open-source Galileo-for-DPU and our testing harness at this https URL .

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv cs.AR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Hardware Architecture (cs.AR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06036 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-05T18:13:33.977Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).