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Casting the Net! Revisiting MasterFace Impersonation Attacks — arXiv:2608.06952

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06952
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T09:52:59.376Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
96337525e36071c3d3f1ba54dfc49f2e26535341dc7f8647df85d79b4eea0f31
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7a2b94d08e35

How to cite

Casting the Net! Revisiting MasterFace Impersonation Attacks — arXiv:2608.06952 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06952 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7a2b94d08e35 (Metraipolis archive dc_7a2b94d08e35, sha256 96337525e36071c3d3f1ba54dfc49f2e26535341dc7f8647df85d79b4eea0f31)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7a2b94d08e35,
  title = {Casting the Net! Revisiting MasterFace Impersonation Attacks — arXiv:2608.06952},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06952},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7a2b94d08e35; sha256 96337525e36071c3d3f1ba54dfc49f2e26535341dc7f8647df85d79b4eea0f31},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06952. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Impersonation is a fundamental security threat in face recognition systems (FRSs). While the security of FRSs has been challenged by various attack vectors, under realistic adversarial capabilities, e.g., a limited number of decision-only authentication trials and no internal system knowledge, most attack techniques become infeasible. As a result, impersonation by zero-effort impostors, characterized by false match rate (FMR), is commonly regarded as a standalone baseline. A few years ago, impersonation attacks based on MasterFaces emerged as a notable security threat that could break the barrier of the FMR-based baseline under such realistic constraints. However, they were believed not to yield impersonation above the standard FMR in modern FRSs, as discussed by multiple follow-up studies. In this paper, we demonstrate that even legitimate access to public commercial APIs allows an adversary to amplify impersonation rates through MasterFaces, resulting in a non-trivial impersonation attack beyond FMR on downstream applications built on top of these APIs. We observe that several real-world FRS deployments are implemented using commercial APIs, and that the backend service provider is publicly disclosed or trivially inferable. As a result, the adversary can purchase these pay-as-you-go API services without requiring any additional privilege over the target FRS. From this observation, we formalize the MasterFaces attack as a maximum coverage problem over the biometric representation space, which we call a NET, and show that the adversary can construct an API-tailored NET by leveraging the geometric structure of the representation space. We demonstrate that our attack amplifies the impersonation rates of several open-source and commercial API-based FRSs by up to 9.5$\times$ within at most 30 authentication trials, compared to those expected from the standard FMR.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-10 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06952 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T09:51:05.646Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).