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Prior-Free Delegation — arXiv:2609.31529
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31529
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T04:16:31.760Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
7e5c81c25dd07ae3fb78d101885ba9a57fd9d17b5f2ca19b8edb1c740072a520- Stable URL of this page
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Prior-Free Delegation — arXiv:2609.31529 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31529 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7a02a05c375c (Metraipolis archive dc_7a02a05c375c, sha256 7e5c81c25dd07ae3fb78d101885ba9a57fd9d17b5f2ca19b8edb1c740072a520)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7a02a05c375c,
title = {Prior-Free Delegation — arXiv:2609.31529},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31529},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7a02a05c375c; sha256 7e5c81c25dd07ae3fb78d101885ba9a57fd9d17b5f2ca19b8edb1c740072a520},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31529. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We consider a robust delegation problem in which the principal does not know the distribution from which the underlying state is drawn. The principal can choose a general randomized mechanism and maximizes her worst-case expected payoff over all state distributions. Our main result characterizes the robustly optimal mechanism. The mechanism has up to three regions: (i) accommodation, where the agent's ideal action is taken, (ii) calibrated randomization, where each type receives a distinct lottery, and (iii) pooling, where all types receive the same lottery. We then extend our model to a multidimensional setting in which preferences are additively separable and satisfy a cross-dimensional symmetry condition, and show that delegating separately across dimensions is robustly optimal. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-28 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31529 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T03:49:20.364Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-28?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).