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Metric-Based Equilibrium Selection in Noncooperative Differentiable Games — arXiv:2610.07307
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07307
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T11:27:47.391Z
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Metric-Based Equilibrium Selection in Noncooperative Differentiable Games — arXiv:2610.07307 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07307 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_789c032e08e8 (Metraipolis archive dc_789c032e08e8, sha256 bac9f00730498f02eac5516de991ca0d2a0aa9ff23613f648fc0ad8223a0eac6)
BibTeX
@misc{dc789c032e08e8,
title = {Metric-Based Equilibrium Selection in Noncooperative Differentiable Games — arXiv:2610.07307},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07307},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_789c032e08e8; sha256 bac9f00730498f02eac5516de991ca0d2a0aa9ff23613f648fc0ad8223a0eac6},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07307. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Metric conditioning can change which equilibrium attracts learning dynamics without moving the equilibria of a differentiable game. We study how to use state-dependent symmetric positive-definite (SPD) metrics to select among known equilibria by keeping a designated equilibrium attracting while making a rival unstable. Building on classical results on matrix stability under positive-definite multiplication, we characterize when such destabilization is possible and show how restricting the metric to act independently on each player limits the stability changes that can be achieved at differential Nash equilibria. We then combine a stabilizing metric at the selected equilibrium with a destabilizing metric at the rival through smooth interpolation, yielding a single metric field that preserves every equilibrium of the game while assigning the desired local stability types. We also derive a step-size condition for implementing the method in discrete time. The approach is validated on a continuous-commitment stag hunt and an entropy-regularized iterated prisoner's dilemma, where it selects the desired equilibrium in both settings. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Systems and Control (eess.SY). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07307 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T11:16:54.471Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).