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Self-Referenced Social Preferences: Cooperation without Observing Others Rewards — arXiv:2610.07881

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07881
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T11:17:22.663Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
af514644c7aa60c2b9b674b2105074bb6dbbb7b87398cde87c5e29bd33ed94f9
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_77ddc376ec92

How to cite

Self-Referenced Social Preferences: Cooperation without Observing Others Rewards — arXiv:2610.07881 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07881 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_77ddc376ec92 (Metraipolis archive dc_77ddc376ec92, sha256 af514644c7aa60c2b9b674b2105074bb6dbbb7b87398cde87c5e29bd33ed94f9)
BibTeX
@misc{dc77ddc376ec92,
  title = {Self-Referenced Social Preferences: Cooperation without Observing Others Rewards — arXiv:2610.07881},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07881},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_77ddc376ec92; sha256 af514644c7aa60c2b9b674b2105074bb6dbbb7b87398cde87c5e29bd33ed94f9},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07881. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Social preferences can promote cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning, but existing approaches often require agents to observe the rewards of their peers. In many real-world interactions, however, an agent can, as humans do, observe others' behavior and outcomes without access to their private reward signals. We introduce self-referenced social preferences, in which each agent learns a model of its own reward, applies it to other agents' observed transitions to assess their outcomes from its own perspective, and feeds these self-referenced assessments into standard social preferences. We study two ways to incorporate these assessments: modifying the learning reward, or using them to weight policy updates. We evaluate the approach on three sequential social dilemmas, Escape Room, Clean Up, and Commons Harvest, which require volunteering, public-good contribution, and resource restraint, respectively. Across all three environments, agents learn cooperative behavior without observing others' rewards, including in settings where independent learners fail to cooperate, and frequently achieve more equitable divisions of jointly produced returns than agents with access to true rewards. The effective integration point depends on the social preference: inequity aversion works best in the reward together with a value look-ahead, whereas a purely benevolent preference benefits from policy-update weighting. Under partial observability, the policy-update approach continues to support cooperation. These results show that explicit access to other agents' reward signals is not necessary for learning cooperative behavior: social preferences can instead be grounded in self-referenced assessments of others' outcomes derived from their observed behavior.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.MA, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) ; Multiagent Systems (cs.MA).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07881 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T11:15:09.483Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.MA/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).