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Stability and Perfection in Constrained Weighted Network Games — arXiv:2611.06775

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06775
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-05T18:20:25.010Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
68b700a5df74189b0f46c6f9a196bbbc741fcc9a1c2215e5795ea65d756f493a
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_76f7a2bc9042

How to cite

Stability and Perfection in Constrained Weighted Network Games — arXiv:2611.06775 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06775 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_76f7a2bc9042 (Metraipolis archive dc_76f7a2bc9042, sha256 68b700a5df74189b0f46c6f9a196bbbc741fcc9a1c2215e5795ea65d756f493a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc76f7a2bc9042,
  title = {Stability and Perfection in Constrained Weighted Network Games — arXiv:2611.06775},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06775},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_76f7a2bc9042; sha256 68b700a5df74189b0f46c6f9a196bbbc741fcc9a1c2215e5795ea65d756f493a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06775. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We introduce a general framework of constrained weighted network formation in which agents allocate resources across coalitional interactions while facing feasibility constraints. More precisely, we allow arbitrary coalitions of agents to be assigned a continuous weight, and we incorporate both coalitional capacity constraints and individual budget constraints into the model. This framework extends the weighted network formation model of Bich and Morhaim by combining continuous interaction intensities with endogenous feasibility restrictions. Within this setting, we introduce a new notion of stability -- called coalitionwise stability -- extending pairwise stability to constrained network games. Under standard continuity and componentwise quasiconcavity assumptions on payoff functions, we establish the existence of coalitionwise stable networks. We then investigate refinements of stability inspired by the notion of perfect equilibrium introduced by Selten, and by the notion of perfect pairwise stability developed by Bich and Teteryatnikova for network games. The presence of feasibility constraints fundamentally alters the geometry of the feasible set, which no longer possesses a product structure. As a consequence, trembling-hand type refinements become substantially more delicate, since perturbations of some interactions may render other interactions infeasible. Nevertheless, we introduce constrained analogues of both the trembling-hand and perturbative notions of perfect stability considered by Bich and Teteryatnikova, and study their existence and their relationship. In particular, we show the equivalence between these trembling-hand and perturbative formulations under some componentwise monotonicity assumption.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06775 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-05T18:14:18.996Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).