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Non-Linear Pricing Restores Tractability for a Data Seller — arXiv:2609.36589

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36589
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T17:25:52.502Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
4c35d78c1981cdfc86cbc9ac9fce055105e59098b007260fc82bc3cbb20a967a
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_76a2f4a690ba

How to cite

Non-Linear Pricing Restores Tractability for a Data Seller — arXiv:2609.36589 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36589 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_76a2f4a690ba (Metraipolis archive dc_76a2f4a690ba, sha256 4c35d78c1981cdfc86cbc9ac9fce055105e59098b007260fc82bc3cbb20a967a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc76a2f4a690ba,
  title = {Non-Linear Pricing Restores Tractability for a Data Seller — arXiv:2609.36589},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36589},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_76a2f4a690ba; sha256 4c35d78c1981cdfc86cbc9ac9fce055105e59098b007260fc82bc3cbb20a967a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36589. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We consider a data seller who designs pricing mechanisms over multiple datasets to maximize revenue from budget-constrained buyers. The seller offers multiple datasets and assigns each a pricing function that maps the quantity purchased to a total payment. The goal is to design these pricing functions to maximize revenue, anticipating that buyers---who trade off accuracy gains against cost---choose bundles optimally subject to their budget constraints. Prior work [Chaudhury et al., 2026] studies such optimal pricing under the restriction that each dataset is assigned a linear price, and shows that computing optimal linear prices is computationally intractable. In contrast, we allow each dataset to be priced via a general function and show that this additional flexibility can not only increase the revenue but also restore tractability, yielding a surprising simultaneous improvement in economic performance and computational efficiency. Even when pricing functions are only required to be monotone and lower-continuous, optimal pricing admits a highly structured and simple form: each pricing function is piecewise linear and convex (PLC), and the optimal solution can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, the total number of kinks across all pricing functions is bounded by the number of buyers. Consequently, when datasets significantly outnumber buyers, most pricing functions are effectively linear. We further empirically study the structure of optimal pricing by analyzing the number of kinks and the revenue gap between optimal nonlinear pricing and optimal linear pricing on simulations generated from a real dataset.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-30 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36589 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T16:57:11.433Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-30?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).