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Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion — arXiv:2609.08259

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T13:30:10.604Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
b35dec4976aed7f46a143e0fe0045e32a4511594c7bb04e355d7f468f8a64575
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_75e1cff9df2e

How to cite

Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion — arXiv:2609.08259 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_75e1cff9df2e (Metraipolis archive dc_75e1cff9df2e, sha256 b35dec4976aed7f46a143e0fe0045e32a4511594c7bb04e355d7f468f8a64575)
BibTeX
@misc{dc75e1cff9df2e,
  title = {Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion — arXiv:2609.08259},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_75e1cff9df2e; sha256 b35dec4976aed7f46a143e0fe0045e32a4511594c7bb04e355d7f468f8a64575},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We prove the existence of a randomized voting rule with metric distortion at most $2.13713$, within $0.025$ of the lower bound of $2.11264$. Our rule comes from a generalization of stable $k$-lotteries developed in the context of committee selection. In contrast to prior work, our rule samples from a single distribution derived from a zero-sum game, without mixing between voting rules. Our result also gives sharp distortion bounds for stable $k$-lotteries, and in particular shows that stable $2$-lotteries have distortion $7/3$, despite only relying on aggregate preferences over triples of candidates.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-09 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T13:06:09.177Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-09?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).