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Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion — arXiv:2609.08259
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T13:30:10.604Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion — arXiv:2609.08259 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_75e1cff9df2e (Metraipolis archive dc_75e1cff9df2e, sha256 b35dec4976aed7f46a143e0fe0045e32a4511594c7bb04e355d7f468f8a64575)
BibTeX
@misc{dc75e1cff9df2e,
title = {Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion — arXiv:2609.08259},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_75e1cff9df2e; sha256 b35dec4976aed7f46a143e0fe0045e32a4511594c7bb04e355d7f468f8a64575},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We prove the existence of a randomized voting rule with metric distortion at most $2.13713$, within $0.025$ of the lower bound of $2.11264$. Our rule comes from a generalization of stable $k$-lotteries developed in the context of committee selection. In contrast to prior work, our rule samples from a single distribution derived from a zero-sum game, without mixing between voting rules. Our result also gives sharp distortion bounds for stable $k$-lotteries, and in particular shows that stable $2$-lotteries have distortion $7/3$, despite only relying on aggregate preferences over triples of candidates. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-09 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08259 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T13:06:09.177Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-09?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).