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The Market and the Jungle — arXiv:2611.02635

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02635
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T19:07:16.423Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
182bdcc7f567092e86d6b19538f0c69c538558d3d4112bc8f7679c83adaeed5f
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_75a0751979bd

How to cite

The Market and the Jungle — arXiv:2611.02635 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02635 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_75a0751979bd (Metraipolis archive dc_75a0751979bd, sha256 182bdcc7f567092e86d6b19538f0c69c538558d3d4112bc8f7679c83adaeed5f)
BibTeX
@misc{dc75a0751979bd,
  title = {The Market and the Jungle — arXiv:2611.02635},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02635},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_75a0751979bd; sha256 182bdcc7f567092e86d6b19538f0c69c538558d3d4112bc8f7679c83adaeed5f},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02635. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study how different institutions governing property rights and economic transactions shape occupational choices and welfare. Individuals in our society choose occupations that determine their production and consumption opportunities, anticipating either anonymous, voluntary market exchange supported by public enforcement (the market), or allocations through a random coercive hierarchy (the jungle) without monetary compensation. We establish conditions for occupational equilibria to exist in the market and in the jungle, and compare their performance. At a common occupational profile, the market maximizes aggregate surplus, whereas allocations in the jungle are Pareto efficient with monetary holdings fixed but need not maximize surplus. Endogenous occupational choices introduce an additional source of institutional differences. We find that a market occupational equilibrium outperforms a jungle occupational equilibrium, in aggregate terms, under two conditions: (i) every occupation in the jungle is available in the market, and (ii) the market is perfectly competitive, in the sense that prices cannot be manipulated by unilateral changes in occupations. We also establish an individual welfare comparison without this price-invariance condition: among identical individuals, everyone weakly prefers an occupational equilibrium in the market to a symmetric occupational equilibrium in the jungle. Our analysis places the institutional foundations of exchange at the center of the welfare comparison and provides a framework for studying coercive institutions that survive alongside markets.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02635 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:25:22.743Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).