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Coordinating the Unknown Lipschitz Constant in Multiplayer Bandits — arXiv:2608.10526

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10526
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T06:09:15.473Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
56a5eccad460917d414872ff1518500c48595e8b26f6baafc47977afc8c3b351
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_756bde9d8ef8

How to cite

Coordinating the Unknown Lipschitz Constant in Multiplayer Bandits — arXiv:2608.10526 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10526 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_756bde9d8ef8 (Metraipolis archive dc_756bde9d8ef8, sha256 56a5eccad460917d414872ff1518500c48595e8b26f6baafc47977afc8c3b351)
BibTeX
@misc{dc756bde9d8ef8,
  title = {Coordinating the Unknown Lipschitz Constant in Multiplayer Bandits — arXiv:2608.10526},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10526},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_756bde9d8ef8; sha256 56a5eccad460917d414872ff1518500c48595e8b26f6baafc47977afc8c3b351},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10526. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Motivated by decentralized applications, we study cooperative multi-agent bandits in continuous (Lipschitz) action spaces when the Lipschitz constant is unknown. We consider three information structures: (A)~unobserved actions with common rewards, (B)~observed actions with independent rewards, and (C)~unobserved actions with independent rewards. In each case we design and analyze an algorithm that estimates the Lipschitz constant, chooses a discretization of the joint action space, and applies a cooperative bandit method to the induced discrete problem. Players never communicate once learning starts, so the central difficulty is that they must reach the \emph{same} discretization from their own data. We prove regret guarantees showing that common rewards and observable actions each supply this agreement for free, and that in their absence agreement can still be bought, through a dithered quantization of the estimate, at no cost in the leading order of the regret.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-12 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Machine Learning (cs.LG) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.10526 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T05:57:28.378Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-08-12?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).