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Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base — arXiv:2610.03922

Source
arXiv
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03922
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T05:29:29.262Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
eb7bef22d5cf6f759ea0b92de0418ea5f630ebb8bee6904dbbb54b89a452682a
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_74e623a8d283

How to cite

Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base — arXiv:2610.03922 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03922 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_74e623a8d283 (Metraipolis archive dc_74e623a8d283, sha256 eb7bef22d5cf6f759ea0b92de0418ea5f630ebb8bee6904dbbb54b89a452682a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc74e623a8d283,
  title = {Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base — arXiv:2610.03922},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03922},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_74e623a8d283; sha256 eb7bef22d5cf6f759ea0b92de0418ea5f630ebb8bee6904dbbb54b89a452682a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03922. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Flashblocks divide a block's priority gas auction into shorter sequential auctions that commit transaction order before the block is complete. We ask how this auction cadence affects bidding and competition among automated arbitrageurs, or searchers. In July 2025 Base replaced a single 2 s auction with ten 200 ms auctions. We use this change to estimate the searcher response from on-chain data alone. On an address-day panel of 3,032 searchers and 8,053 activity-matched controls, a difference-in-differences design estimates a 0.187 gwei fall in the effective priority fee (59% of the searcher pre-period mean). The share of searcher priority-fee value paid in the first tenth of block gas falls from 0.98 to 0.28. This fee compression is the identified effect. The revert-rate response is not (causally) identified and is reported descriptively. At the level of a single opportunity, the winning fee splits into an approximately invariant floor and a competitive premium. The premium scales about linearly with auction duration at high contention and less steeply at low contention. A first-price auction model with uncertain arrival and partial payments by losing searchers accounts for this pattern. We match attempts to the pool they contest. A higher-fee transaction reverts behind a lower-fee winner that landed earlier in 1.9 to 2.7% of contested opportunities by value, an upper bound. Latency therefore decides part of the ordering. A micro-auction model projects diminishing returns from shortening the window below 200 ms, as bids approach a nonzero floor. Rollups such as Arbitrum One now make auction cadence a governance tunable parameter, so these estimates inform how it is set.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science (cs.CE) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Trading and Market Microstructure (q-fin.TR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03922 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T05:25:35.325Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).