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Competition drives excessive recruitment in collective search — arXiv:2609.11715
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11715
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T07:09:51.459Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
Competition drives excessive recruitment in collective search — arXiv:2609.11715 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11715 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_748e32664653 (Metraipolis archive dc_748e32664653, sha256 08519f3c48e7326055437363af2efab7318a4103148dbd15d0621857df4456ac)
BibTeX
@misc{dc748e32664653,
title = {Competition drives excessive recruitment in collective search — arXiv:2609.11715},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11715},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_748e32664653; sha256 08519f3c48e7326055437363af2efab7318a4103148dbd15d0621857df4456ac},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11715. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Groups that search collectively often exploit what they find by recruiting: one member directs others to a site it has found. Recruitment raises the number of members foraging at a known site, but the return per forager may fall as that number grows, so there is an intermediate optimal recruitment rate. In addition, a site may be used by more than one group. Here we analyze a model of two groups that forage from a single site whose return declines with the total number of foragers present. The two groups interact only through this shared return. The long-run outcome is either coexistence at the foraging site or monopoly by one group, and we analyze the boundary between these two outcomes. A group's best response to its rival is not monotone: it increases its own recruitment rate with the rival's recruitment rate in an attempt to preserve a monopoly, and then its recruitment rate drops discontinuously when it is no longer optimal to preserve a monopoly. We analyze how model parameters govern this shift: a group relinquishes monopoly when the site saturates at few foragers and when the rival group is small. When the two groups have comparable size there are multiple Nash equilibria, so either group may end up with the larger share. And when two equally matched groups compete, both recruit above the rate that maximizes their common return, so that each individual ends with less than it would in a single undivided group of the same total size. Tema degli esploratori: scienze della vita e salute (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in q-bio.PE). Categorie arXiv: Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11715 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T06:49:16.945Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/q-bio.PE/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).