Metraipolis › archive › dc_7331b22c0cfa

Crowds Believe in You: Online Prediction Markets Overestimate How Often People Achieve Their Own Goals — arXiv:2610.40324

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40324
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-31T06:22:05.521Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: a8996e34fcab16bc3be55d2f5daec69fd79d51bf974aa4fb41cc26203133a426
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7331b22c0cfa

How to cite

Crowds Believe in You: Online Prediction Markets Overestimate How Often People Achieve Their Own Goals — arXiv:2610.40324 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40324 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7331b22c0cfa (Metraipolis archive dc_7331b22c0cfa, sha256 a8996e34fcab16bc3be55d2f5daec69fd79d51bf974aa4fb41cc26203133a426)

BibTeX

@misc{dc7331b22c0cfa,
  title = {Crowds Believe in You: Online Prediction Markets Overestimate How Often People Achieve Their Own Goals — arXiv:2610.40324},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40324},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7331b22c0cfa; sha256 a8996e34fcab16bc3be55d2f5daec69fd79d51bf974aa4fb41cc26203133a426},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40324. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

People increasingly share personal goals online and invite others to forecast them. Research on the planning fallacy finds that observers predict a person's behavior less optimistically than the person does, and prediction markets aggregate such judgments, harnessing the wisdom of crowds. We study 6,150 prediction markets on Manifold in which 1,660 users asked about their own futures ("Will I ...?"), reconstruct every order and execution, and compare these self-markets with markets about external events. Self-markets resolved YES 4.4 percentage points less often than their final prices implied, whereas external markets were nearly calibrated (0.9 points); the difference was 2.2 points at the same price level and 1.9 points within creators who made both kinds of market. Absent when markets opened, the overstatement emerged within a day of trading, even where the person never traded, and peaked in the week before close. In a market's first day, observers moved external-market prices down toward the base rate, but moved self-market prices 3.6 points further toward YES, except in markets naming an outcome the person would not want, which were not overpriced. The correction came late and largely from the person, whose orders supplied 38% of the eventual movement toward the outcome in self-markets, against 9% in external markets. Because self-market prices mainly failed to separate successes from failures, a recalibration learned from earlier markets improved later forecasts by only 1.5%. Crowds believe in the futures people pose for themselves, and the information that would correct them lies with the person.

Tema degli esploratori: governance digitale e beni comuni (elenco arXiv cs.CY, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC) ; Computers and Society (cs.CY); Social and Information Networks (cs.SI); General Economics (econ.GN).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40324 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T06:08:38.280Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CY/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).