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Price Dislocations, News Citations, and Epistemic Leverage on Polymarket — arXiv:2609.06005

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06005
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T13:23:50.550Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
2c08bba54dc1cb267e83325ccc89768e50378937b6e9666cb852a31eab11b88d
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7292e89b49f9

How to cite

Price Dislocations, News Citations, and Epistemic Leverage on Polymarket — arXiv:2609.06005 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06005 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7292e89b49f9 (Metraipolis archive dc_7292e89b49f9, sha256 2c08bba54dc1cb267e83325ccc89768e50378937b6e9666cb852a31eab11b88d)
BibTeX
@misc{dc7292e89b49f9,
  title = {Price Dislocations, News Citations, and Epistemic Leverage on Polymarket — arXiv:2609.06005},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06005},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_7292e89b49f9; sha256 2c08bba54dc1cb267e83325ccc89768e50378937b6e9666cb852a31eab11b88d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06005. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Prediction-market probabilities increasingly appear in news coverage, yet little is known about which market movements become news or how much trading money sits behind the numbers journalists quote. Unlike a poll, a market price can be moved by anyone willing to trade, so the cost of manufacturing a number that circulates as news bears directly on the information environment. We link 173.7 million signed Polymarket trades to news coverage from 2024-2025. From 6,990 articles mentioning prediction-market venues, an LLM-based, human-validated matcher extracts 1,582 sentences quoting market odds and attributes 918 to the specific market whose price they cite. We then detect 44,976 price dislocations, movements of at least five percentage points backed by concentrated one-sided trading, and ask whether a market is cited more often afterward. In the days after a dislocation, a market's citation rate is about 33% higher than its matched baseline (log citation-rate ratio $\tau_{\mathrm{cite}}=0.283$, permutation $p=0.001$), robust to binary and Poisson count outcomes. Yet move size is not the strongest predictor of citation: prominence dominates (standardized $\beta=0.610$ vs. $\beta=0.159$ for move size). Finally, we combine the dollar flow behind a given price change with observed citation rates into a metric we call epistemic leverage, the dollars needed to move a market five points and have the move cited. It stays near \$0.7-1.0 million across prominence quintiles, because cheaper-to-move markets are proportionally less likely to be cited. The implied threat model centers not on the long tail of cheaply moved markets but on the few prominent markets newsrooms treat as informational infrastructure, where a seven-figure price of influence sits within the budgets of actors with a large stake in the quoted number. We release aggregate event-study data and validation materials.

Tema degli esploratori: governance digitale e beni comuni (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-09 in cs.CY).
Categorie arXiv: Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) ; Computers and Society (cs.CY); Social and Information Networks (cs.SI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06005 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T13:05:53.944Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CY/2026-09-09?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).