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AI and the Market for Signals — arXiv:2609.17752

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17752
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T18:11:05.470Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
b5d0ce2547b61bb2322dd94e84143a84cebf64902162ed600a154bee8a88cc64
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_71a864126d4e

How to cite

AI and the Market for Signals — arXiv:2609.17752 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17752 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_71a864126d4e (Metraipolis archive dc_71a864126d4e, sha256 b5d0ce2547b61bb2322dd94e84143a84cebf64902162ed600a154bee8a88cc64)
BibTeX
@misc{dc71a864126d4e,
  title = {AI and the Market for Signals — arXiv:2609.17752},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17752},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_71a864126d4e; sha256 b5d0ce2547b61bb2322dd94e84143a84cebf64902162ed600a154bee8a88cc64},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17752. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Early-career work both signals a worker's ability and builds long-run skills. We introduce an AI industry into a career signaling model. The industry sells tokens, which workers convert into output indistinguishable from their own. We compare three regimes: no token trade, purchases only, and open trade with side sales. With no token trade, market learns every type, signalling incentives create a rat race and workers work above the full information level. With token purchases only, lower types buy output but the market still learns every type. Buying by lower types raises the signal higher types must post, so the high types can work harder than before AI. Buyers work less with AI, even below the full-information level. With side sales and abundant AI, the signal no longer depends on effort and every type under-invests in skill. Workers gain from token trade only when welfare improves, never the reverse, and the difference is the AI industry's profit. In education, where output has no value, every worker loses in the separating equilibrium, but with valuable output and cheap tokens everyone gains. Token taxes, wage taxes, and watermarking have ambiguous effects on workers' payoffs and welfare, and their effects depend on whether workers can sell output on the side.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-17 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17752 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T17:33:45.721Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).