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Assessing Runtime Electromagnetic Detection of CPU Hardware Trojans Targeting Kernel Memory — arXiv:2609.23186

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23186
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-09T07:00:59.807Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
464a00aa6caa15246011fbdafbcf3b809b39be32cc12d082c1b4561673b38dbc
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_70606db32191

How to cite

Assessing Runtime Electromagnetic Detection of CPU Hardware Trojans Targeting Kernel Memory — arXiv:2609.23186 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23186 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_70606db32191 (Metraipolis archive dc_70606db32191, sha256 464a00aa6caa15246011fbdafbcf3b809b39be32cc12d082c1b4561673b38dbc)
BibTeX
@misc{dc70606db32191,
  title = {Assessing Runtime Electromagnetic Detection of CPU Hardware Trojans Targeting Kernel Memory — arXiv:2609.23186},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23186},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_70606db32191; sha256 464a00aa6caa15246011fbdafbcf3b809b39be32cc12d082c1b4561673b38dbc},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23186. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Side-channels are a promising approach for hardware trojan detection, as they can passively reveal malicious hardware activity without requiring additional circuitry or destructive analysis of the device under test. This work investigates the use of electromagnetic (EM) emanations for runtime detection of hardware trojan attacks. Using an open-source hardware trojan that implements an arbitrary memory-write primitive, we tamper with the kernel memory of a Linux system running on a RISC-V microarchitecture and perform a real-time baseline detection using the processor's EM emissions. Our results indicate that, under certain conditions, hardware trojans can be detected indirectly through the anomalous software behavior they enable.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23186 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T06:56:00.969Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).