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Cautious and fair social evaluation under risk — arXiv:2609.13613

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13613
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T02:55:31.510Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
7f034996d36867230006b0020ad68fba2f55d762a69f07dcd56c398b231b756b
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_700fe5d45dd9

How to cite

Cautious and fair social evaluation under risk — arXiv:2609.13613 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13613 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_700fe5d45dd9 (Metraipolis archive dc_700fe5d45dd9, sha256 7f034996d36867230006b0020ad68fba2f55d762a69f07dcd56c398b231b756b)
BibTeX
@misc{dc700fe5d45dd9,
  title = {Cautious and fair social evaluation under risk — arXiv:2609.13613},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13613},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_700fe5d45dd9; sha256 7f034996d36867230006b0020ad68fba2f55d762a69f07dcd56c398b231b756b},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13613. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

In this paper, we study criteria for social evaluation of resource distributions under risk when individuals have expected utility preferences but their utility functions are interpersonally non-comparable. In particular, we focus on cautious evaluation with respect to ex-post distributions. As a key rationality axiom, we adopt Negative Certainty Independence, introduced by Dillenberger (2010). Using this axiom together with Pareto conditions that are compatible with both the rationality axiom and ex-post equity, we characterize a class of social criteria called Cautious Equally Distributed Equivalent (CEDE) criteria. These criteria evaluate risky situations by the lowest certainty equivalent over a set of social utility functions constructed from individual utility functions.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-15 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13613 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T02:44:49.877Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-15?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).